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Abstract  
Football match-fixing in Greece has a relatively long history, however, 
from the late 1990s it has been considered as a serious problem for the sport in 
the country. Despite the history of the phenomenon in the country, Greece has only 
relatively recently been identified as one of the hotspots for football match-fixing 
on an international level. Following the recent scandal exposure of fixed matches 
in Greece in 2011, also known as Koriopolis (a pun name on the Italian scandal 
Calciopolis and the Greek word ‘korios’ or phone-tap), detailed information about 
numerous matches played in the 2008/09, 2009/10 and 2010/11 seasons that 
attracted UEFA’s attention were brought into the public eye. Soon after, legal 
action was taken against individuals involved in the process, with a number of 
club officials facing lifelong bans from any footballrelated activity, and football 
clubs either relegated or excluded from European competitions and the Super 
League itself for their involvement in the scandal. In May 2013, the number of 
people facing charges exceeded 200, with some of them having already been 
imprisoned for their involvement in the scandal. Following the aforementioned 
scandal exposure, a vast amount of information regarding football match-fixing 
was made available to the public. The aim of the current article is to provide an 
account of the social organisation of football match-fixing in Greece. Our account 
is based on three main sources of data: the telephone conversations that were the 
result of wiretapping by the National Intelligence Agency in relation to the latest 
football match-fixing scandal (of 2011), published media sources, and interviews with 
informed actors from the realm of Greek football. 
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Introduction 
Match-fixing is often presented as a vague term that describes sport-related illegal 
dealings between powerful people behind closed doors. The motivation for matchfixing 
can vary from purely economic benefits, which can be direct or indirect, to sport 
benefits depending on the circumstances. The history of match-fixing is a very long 
one. According to the journal Archaeology (1996 cited in European Commission 2012: 
10), the first documented case of match-fixing seems to be that of Eupolos of Thessaly 
who bribed three of his boxing competitors in order to win a gold medal at the Olympic 
Games of 338 BC. Nowadays, although it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of 
match-fixing, it seems that football is the primary context of fixed matches although 
other sports such as cricket, basketball, tennis, sumo, horse-racing, and snooker seem to 
have fallen victims of the practice (see, for example, Carpenter 2012; The Guardian 
2013a; The Guardian 2013b; Gorse and Chadwick n.d.; Qureshi and Verma 2013; 
Brooks et al. 2013). 
Football match-fixing is often associated with ‘organised crime’ in media, academic, 
and other literature. In Declan Hill’s (2010) journalistic account, The Fix, what is 
described in the activities of a Chinese businessman, Ye Zheyun, who was involved in 
match-fixing in Belgium buying off football clubs with financial problems and gaining 
significant amounts of money from the Asian betting markets. Ralf Mutschke, FIFA’s 
head of security, suggests that “organised crime recently switched from drug trafficking 
to match-fixing” and that “the business of match manipulation [is] irresistibly attractive 
to international organised crime” (Mutschke 2013: ix-x). Moreover, references to 
‘mafias’ infesting the world of football and using it as a money-making and money 
laundering platform are commonplace (see Feltes 2013; UNODC 2013; INTERPOL 
2013; Goal.com 2013). 
Football match-fixing in Greece has a relatively long history, however, from the late 
1990s it has been considered as a serious problem for the sport in the country. Matchfixing 
(and general corruption) in football was brought to the public eye thought the 
disclosure and extensive publicity the ‘paraga’ scandal received. The ‘paraga’ (literally, 
‘The Shanty’) scandal, was structured around a mechanism of fixing matches by 
selecting specific referees for specific matches in order for specific clubs to benefit, 
and involved a number of clubs’ Board of Director members, Governing Bodies 
officials and professional referees (Eleftherotypia 2011). By the time the scandal was 
exposed in 2002, outcome uncertainty within the league had reached extreme low 
levels, causing significant competitive imbalance among the clubs. This imbalance did 
not only lead to the creation of ‘big’ and ‘small’ teams as Szymanski and Kesenne 
(2004) suggest, but also to the formation of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ clubs. As Schmidt and 
Berri (2001) explain in their analysis, since the performance on the field in professional 
competitive sports has a direct impact on their financial income, the gap between these 
two groups is affected by the competitive balance or imbalance of the league or 
competition. 
Likewise, the minimised outcome uncertainty in Greek football led to high levels of 
competitive imbalance within the professional leagues of the sport, leading to the 
creation of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ clubs, with the gap between these two categories being 
widened year after year. Another way to underline this competitive imbalance within 
the league would be to examine the level of probability of determining the winner of the 
league, as Buzzacchi et al. (2004) suggest. Taking into consideration that the Greek 
Championship has been won by the same club 15 times within the last 17 years, 
outcome uncertainty has reached an extreme low level in Greek football, with the Super 
League often being characterised as a monopoly (Eleftherotypia 2013a). It is worth 
mentioning that in a study conducted by the same newspaper on outcome uncertainty in 
football leagues around Europe, Greece ranked on the final position of the 50 European 
Championships list. 
Despite the history of the phenomenon in the country, however, as well as the 
publicity the ‘paranga’ received in the early 2000s, Greece has only relatively recently 
been identified as one of the hotspots for football match-fixing on an international level. 
Following the recent scandal exposure of fixed matches in Greece in 2011, also known 
as Koriopolis (a pun name on the Italian scandal Calciopolis and the Greek word 
‘korios’ or phone-tap), detailed information about numerous matches played in the 
2008/09, 2009/10 and 2010/11 seasons that attracted UEFA’s attention were brought 
into the public eye. According to UEFA Betting Fraud Detection System (BFDS), more 
than 40 matches were found ‘exceptionally questionable’ (Proto Thema 2010). These 
included Super League (first division), Football League (second division) and National 
Cup matches, involving more than 26 football clubs. Soon after, legal action was taken 
against individuals involved in the process, with a number of club officials facing 
lifelong bans from any football-related activity, and football clubs either relegated or 
excluded from European competitions (UEFA Europa League) and the Super League 
itself for their involvement in the scandal. In May 2013, the number of people facing 
charges exceeded 200, with some of them having already been imprisoned for their 
involvement in the scandal (Eleftherotypia 2013b). 
In the accompanying document that was sent to the public prosecutor initially 
investigating the case of match-fixing in Greece along with a transcript of wiretapped 
conversations among the actors involved, there is reference not only to the reasons why 
these individuals were arrested but also that these individuals constituted a ‘criminal 
organisation’ with hierarchy and rigidity, connections with individuals in several 
countries (Cyprus, Italy and Germany), a monopolic position in the market and 
attempts at laundering money from the criminal activities. An aspect, however, that 
lacks clarity is the way and process it occurs as well as the actors this process involves. 
Following the aforementioned scandal exposure, a vast amount of information 
regarding football match-fixing was made available to the public. Numerous media 
presented various intriguing though scattered details regarding the way match-fixing 
was ‘organised’ and managed and the means or resources used in the process, as well as 
the communication channels and actors within this process. Some media sources were 
even able to secure recorded (by the National Intelligence Agency) phone calls between 
a number of the key actors involved, as well as the actual detailed legal case files, 
providing new and accurate information on the issue. It is worth mentioning that the 
estimated number of recorded phone calls regarding the scandal exceeded 39.000 in the 
beginning of 2012 (Vima 2012). 
The aim of the current article is to provide an account of the social organisation 
of football match-fixing in Greece. Among other, this article responds in a more 
structured manner to a relative scarcity of empirical studies on the issue, and to 
Haberfeld and Sheehan’s (2013) ‘hope’ that new initiatives for the study of 
manifestations of sport-related crime issues are developed (see also Petropoulos and Maguire 
2013; Cheloukhine 2013). What we try to do in this article is highlight the 
complexity of the situation with regards to match-fixing around the globe by focusing on 
the case of Greece. This case study constitutes a potential template for research on an 
international level. In the following sections we will present: (a) the methods and data 
used for the study; (b) the actors involved in match-fixing: All, direct and indirect, key 
and secondary actors will be put forward in order for a clear and concise picture of 
match-fixing in Greek football to be presented. Through the analysis, it is made clear 
that not all actors participate intentionally in football match-fixing. On the contrary, 
according to the data available, it is suggested that some actors have operated unintentionally 
either as pressure levers or by ‘turning a blind eye’. Nevertheless, they will be 
presented in a forthcoming section, since they play a part in the elaborate match-fixing 
web; (c) the process involved in match-fixing. Towards the end of the article we will 
attempt at discussing the findings by locating them within the contemporary football-related 
and non-football-related situation in the country and beyond. 
 
Data and methods 
In this effort we utilised three main sources of data. Firstly, we used the telephone 
conversations that were the result of wiretapping by the National Intelligence Agency 
(Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion - EYP) in relation to the latest football match-fixing 
scandal (2011)1. These wiretapped conversations were able to offer abundant information 
about the broad range of actors and groups involved, and identify patterns of social 
organisation across a number of cases many of which were related to one another. In 
addition, the document accompanying the transcribed conversations offers information 
about the offences individuals were charged of and, very interestingly, the authorities’ 
perceptions of the match-fixing schemes as ‘criminal organisations’. 
Secondly, we collected, examined and analysed the published media sources which 
                                            
1 Hereafter, referred to as: EYP – Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion (2011) 
allowed us to obtain information not only on the process behind football match-fixing, 
but also on the key actors involved. The content of newspaper articles found on the 
internet was used. Because match-fixing covers a wide range of phenomena and 
because we were interested in many aspects of match-fixing such as activities, structures, 
and the general context in which match-fixing takes place, in every newspaper’s 
electronic archive, we used combinations of a number of alternative and relative search 
terms: ‘match-fixing’, ‘criminal organisation and football’, ‘network and football’, 
‘money laundering and football’. Articles from five newspapers were selected, namely 
Eleftherotypia, Kathimerini, Ta Nea, To Proto Thema and To Vima from April 2010 to 
December 2013. In addition a large number of local newspaper articles from the 
researchers’ personal archives were used for the same period. There are more than 80 
newspapers nationally circulated in Greece today (including financial/business and 
sports newspapers most of which are tied to the major football clubs e.g Prasini with 
Panathinaikos FC, Ora gia Spor with AEK FC etc.). However, the aforementioned 
newspapers are political and had the highest circulation (see European Journalism 
Centre, 2010). The newspapers mentioned above were chosen for the particular 
research because they represent a range of political affiliations and proclamations 
without belonging to the two extremes, and because they are non-sport and non-tabloid 
newspapers that are circulated throughout the whole country. It was decided that nonsport 
and nontabloid newspapers would be used only as there is a greater possibility for 
more informed accounts to be found in this type of newspapers (see Sparks 2000). 
Finally, in order for some ‘grey’ areas to be clarified, informed actors from the realm 
of Greek football (e.g. individuals working within football clubs) have been also 
interviewed offering their valuable insight on the matter. Theses informed actors were 
accessed by the first author who used to work for a major Super League club and a 
Football League club. Since the anonymity of these informed actors will be kept 
throughout this article, they will be referred to as interviewees in the rest of the text. 
As with any study the current study presents some limitations, which should be 
acknowledged at this stage. The first one has to do with the fact that the wiretapped 
conversations by the Greek National Intelligence Agency are the result of law enforcement 
activity, which in turn is the result of resource restrictions, the competency of 
agents, organizational priorities, and wider political priorities (see Kinzig 2004). 
Creating theoretical frameworks based solely on such data can give the impression of 
a stable community, rather than a volatile market-based series of fluid and mutating 
collaborations (Hobbs 2013; Hobbs and Antonopoulos 2013). As any product of the 
state derived from largely unaccountable agencies, wiretapped conversations need to be 
carefully handled, and should always carry a disclaimer that “the content of this file are 
the fruits of police activity” (see Kitsuse and Cicourel 1963). 
The second set of limitations are related to media sources. When media sources are 
used as sources of technical information about any manifestations of ‘organized crime’, 
they should be treated very cautiously for a variety of reasons. Not only do they most 
often refer to those cases which the authorities came across, thus ignoring cases of 
‘successful’ schemes, but they also tend to present the issues relating to the actors or the 
activity/market itself in a sensational and morally charged manner something that has a 
limited analytical value. Moreover, search engines which material is drawn from, 
depend on the researcher providing keywords, a process which may lead to the 
exclusion of reports that are peripherally relevant but extremely important for the wider 
context of the study (see Jewkes 2011). 
Finally, in relation to the interviews with the informed actors, one can never be 
absolutely certain about the validity of the accounts although practices such as ‘crosschecking’ 
and ‘member checking’ that we have employed can significantly contribute 
towards eliminating untruthful accounts. 
 
The social organisation of football match-fixing in Greece 
 
Actors in the football match-fixing business 
Greek football clubs are structured differently in comparison to most European ones 
regarding their ownership and administration. All clubs participating in the top two 
national divisions, Super League and Football League, are privately own, with their 
main shareholder keeping an active role in the everyday running of the club. The 
shareholder is often voted by the Board of Administration in the role of the ‘President 
of the club’ who, in most cases, acts as the equivalent of the CEO or the Chairman. In some 
occasions, the elected President is not the shareholder, but a person acting on 
behalf of the main shareholder, representing their interests while managing both 
playing and non-playing aspects of the football club. It needs to be underlined that 
although a Fit and Proper test has been passed as a law of the Greek Government in 
1999, Law 2725 of 1999 (Efimerida 1999), it is currently not actively applied, allowing 
for anyone to be involved in the administration of the sport. 
Accordingly, accusations have been made that over the last few decades various 
individuals with ‘improper’ or even criminal past and ‘questionable’ motives have 
entered the Greek football industry and even acquired powerful roles. The available 
data offers some information as to which actors appear in the match-fixing business and 
how collaborations emerge in the first instance, usually within the business of football. 
Similar to other contexts (and other illegal businesses), not all actors are present in all 
match-fixing schemes.  
The different roles are as follows: 
Club Presidents, along with other elected members of the top level of the clubs’ 
administration, appear to be the main group of primary actors in match-fixing. They 
also appear to be the most successful ‘match-fixers’ (see also Hill 2009). According to 
numerous recorded phone-calls that were made public over the summer of 2011, these 
key actors could be even presented as match-fixing initiators in Greece. It is worth 
mentioning that a number of Super League and Football League Presidents and Board 
of Directors (BoD) members currently face legal actions over the match-fixing scandal 
that even resulted in the imprisonment of some of them. One of them is Makis 
Psomiadis, owner of Kavala FC, and an individual with a long history in criminal 
justice as he has been charged for gold smuggling, embezzlement, blackmail, tax 
evasion and has allegedly had a role in torture squads during Greece’s military Junta 
of the late 1960s/early 1970s (Dabilis 2011). The way in which Presidents, shareholders 
and board members have participated in match-fixing and more details on their role will 
be presented in a following section. The term ‘Presidents’ will be used in this study to 
describe this first group of actors purely for the readers’ facilitation. 
Football players, as expected, play an important role in the overall progress of the 
sport. Their ability to perform well has a direct effect to each match result and the 
overall success of their club. Their performance, however, is not always a result of their 
training, abilities, and skills. According to the data available, there have been numerous 
accusations of players underperforming during matches in order for the desired result to 
be achieved (EYP – Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion 2011)2. Additionally, allegations were 
                                            
2 A recent report reveals that 12.8 % of Greek football players interviewed admitted that they had 
been approached to fix a match within the past year, and 64 % of them said they were confident that 
matches in their league were fixed in the last year (Kovac 2014). 
made regarding the timing of a goal scored, suggesting that there was an ulterior motive 
apart from the club’s success in the match. Since betting topics have increased rapidly, 
their involvement in match-fixing has become even more difficult to identify, with 
yellow cards, passes and misses (items that could otherwise be overlooked) being 
possible profitable subjects, suspicion over players’ involvement is still rising. Even 
though fewer legal actions were taken against football players, they appear to be key 
actors in the match-fixing process in Greece. The way in which they are involved in 
match-fixing raises the question of intention on their behalf, with some cases 
underlining the pressure they were under in order to participate in match-fixing schemes. 
It is worth mentioning, however, that according to the data available and the interviewees’ 
accounts, there seems to be no analogy between a player’s age, career or 
nationality and his involvement in match-fixing, with both successful and newcomer, 
Greek and non-Greek players being accused of participation in match-fixing 
(EYP – Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion 2011). 
Referees play an important role in the outcome of each match and the overall success 
of the sport. Their training and education accredited by European or Global governing 
bodies, UEFA and FIFA, respectively, ensure that the decisions made during a match 
are objective, unbiased and justified, with no trace of favouritism towards either of the 
clubs. The referees’ performance and decisions are under constant scrutiny by both 
national and international governing bodies, which evaluate them annually, ensuring at 
the same time that their actions are always driven by a sense of duty towards the 
sport. The pressure referees are under is not limited, however, to the governing bodies 
(see Cheloukhine 2013). Having the power to considerably influence the outcome of a 
match puts referees in the focal point of the media, the fans’, the football clubs’ 
shareholders’ and the players’ interest. Taking all the above into consideration, it is 
highlighted that the importance of referees’ role lies within their ability to ensure that 
their decisions are always unbiased and justified. This ability, however, is often 
questioned. Numerous accusations have been made over time regarding referees’ 
decisions, with some of them proving to be nothing more than fans’ exaggeration. 
A number of these accusations, however, have attracted more than the public attention, 
urging the national and international football governing bodies to take action 
against them. Over the last few years, several referees have received both minor and 
major penalties in Greece, with some of them even losing their license. Due to their 
important role in the outcome of each match, referees are considered key actors in the 
match-fixing process. Their role, however, cannot be viewed as the one of the 
initiator, but more as one of a passive nature (see To Vima 2012; Dabilis 2011). 
Bookmakers have attracted considerable attention since their role in the sport 
industry has created an on-going debate. The legality of their profession has been 
questioned numerous times with new legislation and ruling being passed regularly by 
both legal bodies and sport governing bodies. Football-related legislation has accepted 
bookmaking but introduced strict guidelines regarding its operation and advertising 
within the sport. These measures, however, have proven powerless against modern online 
bookmaking (see Cheloukhine 2013). Following technological advances and their 
rapidly increasing use, such as home and mobile internet, bookmaking could not be 
limited to licensed companies within the country, allowing fans to bet their money on a 
Greek match result using an international betting company situated on the other side of 
the globe (see Naftemporiki 2013). The operations this company follows or the odds 
offered for each match result could not be, therefore, assessed or controlled by the 
football governing bodies, creating a lucrative incentive for match-fixing. Additionally, 
the evolution of bookmaking in modern football allows for odds to be offered for 
numerous possibilities apart from the result of a match. Half-time result, number of 
goals scored, number of passes or misses, number of yellow and red cards or even 
players’ injuries are being offered as betting topics. With the number of betting options 
rising, match-fixing becomes increasingly difficult to detect. Bookmakers have been 
identified as key initiators of the match-fixing process, acting both directly and 
indirectly on the matter. Legal actions were taken against bookmakers and bookmaking 
companies following the recent scandal exposure in Greece, where some individuals 
were even imprisoned (Eleftherotypia 2013b). 
Illegal agents (‘paranomoi praktores’). The particular term is used in the official 
documents by the authorities to identify those individuals who operate on behalf of 
some club Presidents by (a) placing high bets on the games that they have knowledge 
they are manipulated in legal betting shops throughout the country; (b) placing bets in 
international, online betting companies (see Aquilina and Chetcuti 2014). The illegal 
agents effectively place the bets in order to protect the identity of the Presidents 
involved in manipulated football games, and they are trusted individuals who work 
in one of the Presidents legal businesses or are (extended) family members. The illegal 
agents are getting paid for each winning bet they place for the President (EYP – Ethniki 
Ypiresia Pliroforion 2011). 
Enforcers (also known as ‘bravi’) are an extremely important set of actors in the 
football match-fixing business in Greece. They are usually hired or subcontracted to 
complete a job on an ad hoc basis, and they are often involved in protection and 
extortion activities in relation to establishments of the nocturnal economy as well 
as the protection of illegal activities such as the cocaine market in specific suburbs 
of Athens. What they are asked to do is to intimidate or threat football players or 
referees and to vandalise property of ‘disobedient’ actors. In some cases, enforcers 
legally work for a football club as member of the security team. In some 
occasions, enforcers accompany the Presidents when the latter attempt at setting a deal 
(EYP – Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion 2011). 
Football Managers and Player Agents have acquired to important roles in today’s 
modern football industry. Managers have been often identified as the key to the success 
or failure of a team. With valuable and indisputable strategic football skills managers 
have earned their position as the most valuable non-playing individual on the bench of 
a club, with their salary sometimes matching or even exceeding the one of a star 
footballer. Player agents, on the other hand, were introduced to the sport as a result of 
its continuous commercialization over the past two decades. Acting on behalf of the 
players, agents have often been regarded as more than a mere representative of the 
player, with their responsibilities and power over the players’ decisions increasing over 
time. Even though both groups do not often attract public attention, their positions 
within the industry are highly regarded. According to recent data we obtained, both 
Managers and Agents have been involved in match-fixing, with their roles in the 
scandal however, being kept rather vague and unclear. While a number of individuals 
face charges over the scandal, both groups appear to be mostly unwillingly involved, 
while acting as secondary actors or intermediates between the Presidents – initiators 
and the Players (see EYP – Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion 2011). 
Sport media/Press. According to our interviewees, a topic that has not attracted 
enough attention yet is the relations formed between individual members of the Press 
and Bookmakers. It is suggested that these relations involve reporters in profitable 
match-fixing, however, since these accusations cannot be supported with substantial 
evidence and there has been no legal action against them, the Press is considered an 
indirect, passive or secondary actor in Greek football match-fixing (see To Vima 
2013a). It is worth mentioning that both the Press and the Fans are often used as a 
pressure mechanism during the intimidation process of the parties that are unwilling to 
participate in a match-fixing, according to the interviewees in our study. 
National football governing bodies have a regulatory or sanctioning role, while 
acting as the ‘eyes and ears’ of their international counterparts in Greece. Some of these 
bodies are in charge of the leagues football clubs participate in, such as the Super 
League and Football League/Football League 2, while others are responsible for the 
referees’ training and match allocation, such as the Hellenic Football Federation 
(Elliniki Podosfairiki Omospondia – EPO). It has been suggested that governing 
bodies’ tolerance over the last few years has allowed football match-fixing to grow 
to an enormous extend. Individual members of Greek governing bodies have been 
accused of ‘turning a blind eye’ or even actively participating in match-fixing. For 
instance, once of the main protagonist of the Koriopolis scandal, Vangelis Marinakis, 
was both the Hellenic Football Federation’s vice-president and the President of 
Olympiakos F.C. (Niculescu 2014). The fact that there has been legal action against 
members of the above-mentioned bodies, followed by numerous accusations of 
favourable behaviour towards specific football clubs raises the question of their 
integrity or the criteria according to which these individuals were originally chosen/ 
elected in those positions. It is very interesting to note that the Greek football is 
organised on the principles of ‘self-governance’ and ‘autonomy’, where the Greek 
government has very little –if at all – involvement, and the football regulatory bodies 
are responsible for the running of the leagues without the fear of any regulatory actions 
from the Greek state. 
Having examined all actors involved in match-fixing, the process that takes place 
will be presented along with details on each actor’s role. The actors, as introduced 
above, have been identified as directly or indirectly involved in the process, depending 
on the level of their association with football match-fixing. According to the interviewees, 
not all actors are willingly involved in the process, with some being forced to 
participate, as it will be clarified in the following section. 
The process of football match-fixing in Greece 
Before the football match-fixing process description begins, there are various parameters 
that should be taken into consideration. The web of actors described above does not 
have a firm or entrenched nature. On the contrary, its success is based on its flexibility 
and the actors’ improvisation. Since various parties are involved in interlinked relations, 
each match embroils different people, and not all parties are willing to participate in 
match-fixing, generalising the process might lead us to incorrect conclusions. The data 
available, however, provide us with the opportunity to pinpoint the main steps of matchfixing, 
by identifying the relations formed between the parties involved and the chronological 
order in which they take place. 
The match-fixing process resembles a simple web, where various dyadic ties that are 
“criminally exploitable” (von Lampe 2003: 10) are formed, sometimes overlapping 
each other. The available data shows that these relations can be either short–term or 
long-term with a repetitive nature (EYP – Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion 2011). In either 
case, the main means used in order for these relations to be formed between actors 
appear to be intimidation or reward. The former includes threats against one’s physical 
safety, family, career, property and possessions, while the latter mainly comprises of 
financial benefits and future favourable treatment within the football industry. Even 
though serious threats are rarely pragmatised, interviewees suggest that there is an 
increasing rate of intimidation used in match-fixing, especially in Football League 
(second division) matches. 
In more detail, Club Presidents appear to be the ones initiating the entire football 
match-fixing process (Skokas 2011; see also Cheloukhine 2013 for a similar account on 
Russia). Their actions take place according to the following steps which are presented 
in a chronological order. Firstly, Club Presidents contact each other before a match 
involving their clubs takes place. If a desired outcome is agreed between them, the 
match-fixing process can begin. The result is often agreed on using the abovementioned 
means on other actors: intimidation or reward. If the relation between the 
two Presidents is one of a long-term nature, reward is used instead of intimidation, 
making the match-fixing process faster and significantly simpler. When the relation 
between the two parties is relatively new, or in the case one of them is not willing to 
participate, intimidation is used (see Georgakis 2011). After the desired result is agreed 
upon, each President acts independently approaching other relevant actors. Our study 
interviewees, for example, emphasise that Presidents who agree on a desired result for a 
match are not always the Presidents of the two clubs participating in the specific match 
that is to be fixed. On the contrary, depending on the target match, Presidents who 
appear to be irrelevant to the clubs in question are often involved in order for the 
desired outcome of match-fixing to be achieved. 
Secondly, when the officials of each match (e.g., referees and match inspectors) are 
announced by the governing bodies, Presidents evaluate the possibility of approaching 
them. Their evaluation is based on each Referee, information available about him 
(or her), the presence of possible common acquaintances, and the likelihood of 
them participating in match-fixing (see also ESPN 2011). Since this evaluation is a 
subjective process based on individual characteristics, there is no relevant information 
available to be presented. The choice of match officials, however, has often 
raised questions within the industry, with accusations made that Presidents have 
been able to use their power over governing bodies’ officials and arrange for 
specific Referees to be chosen for particular matches. Once contacting the match 
officials is decided, one President is responsible for ensuring the Referee is 
informed of the desired result. The relation between the two parties is secured 
by either threat or reward (see To Vima 2013b) with data suggesting that the 
former is more commonly used. In most cases short-term relations are formed 
between Presidents and Referees, mainly due to the fact that each match has a different 
group of officials. According to the interviewees, when it is evaluated that a Referee will 
not be asked to participate in match-fixing, this step is omitted, ensuring that the officials 
will not be aware of the fixing of a match. 
Thirdly, on the day of the match, players are contacted in order for their role in the 
process to be clarified. According to data available, the Presidents approach players of 
their clubs directly informing them of the desired result and the relevant details 
(Skokas 2011). Enforcers are accompanying the Presidents in this step, acting as a 
pressure level to the players and ensuring that any agreements made will be taken into 
serious consideration and honoured. In rare occasions where the first step of the 
process provided above did not result in an agreement, the President of the rival club 
approaches the clubs’ players, in order to ensure that a well-running business relation 
is formed with them. This relation guarantees the desired result, even if the President 
of a club or the Referee of a match are not involved in match-fixing. It is worth 
mentioning that the number of football players approached in each match varies from 
a few to the whole team. Their involvement also varies within the same match, with 
some players being asked to actively achieve the desired result while some are 
encouraged to ‘turn a blind eye’ (EYP – Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion 2011). Threatening 
the physical integrity of the football players is an integral part of the process in 
order for some reluctant players to be persuaded and often –although this has been the 
case in Football Leagues 1 and 2 only – the presidents threaten that they will not pay 
the players their legal salaries and bonuses. Interviewees in this study underline that 
this step of the process takes place directly before the match and can even involve the 
manager of the team. In some occasions, individual players are not contacted directly 
but through their agent. Notably, it was suggested that this phase can even occur in 
the locker rooms of a team, in an indiscreet way and only a few moments before the 
match starts. Both the managers’ and agents’ involvement is limited to rare occasions 
and under specific circumstances, and especially when an agreement cannot be 
reached quickly or in case a player is not easily approachable. Nevertheless, individual 
managers and agents face legal action against them and have even been imprisoned over 
the 2011 scandal raising suspicion over other possibly hidden aspects of their involvement 
that are yet to be disclosed (see To Vima 2013a; 2013b). 
The fourth step of the process takes place after the match has started and involves 
the evaluation and verification of the desired result. According to our interviewees, 
during the half-time break of the match, all parties’ roles are assessed according to 
the already agreed plan. If the result of the match is the agreed one, no actions are 
needed. However, if the result is not the arranged one, Presidents ensure that all 
parties will fulfil their roles in the second half of the match (To Vima 2010). This is 
achieved by a direct contact between the Presidents and the other parties involved. 
Once again, Enforcers accompany the Presidents in this step, emphasising the 
power the latter hold in the process. The means used in this contact is a combination 
of intimidation and reward, with the former being presented as a more 
successful incentive (Georgakis 2011). Due to the limited timeframe available for 
this step, its execution is often indiscreet. This indiscretion has been the reason for 
the large number of witnesses in this step of match-fixing. It is worth mentioning 
that various stories have been published regarding intimidation incidents taking 
place in the half-time break, occurring in both Super League and Football League 
matches (see To Vima 2010). 
Bookmakers appear to have a double role in this web, acting either directly or 
indirectly depending on each match. The latter entails advertising exceptionally 
favourable odds for a match result without any relations formed between them and 
the above mentioned parties and cannot be considered active participants in matchfixing. 
The former, on the other hand, includes promoting unjustifiably favourable odds 
for a match result to a specific audience in combination with strong relations with one 
or more of the above mentioned actors (EYP – Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion 2011). 
Illegal agents, as already mentioned above, have only the latter dimension in their role. 
These long-term relations ensure that the Bookmaker is aware of the result or various 
relevant details of the match being prearranged and that the odds are agreed upon 
according to it. These odds are then promoted to the parties involved in match-fixing as 
a reward for their role in the process. In other words, the odds become both the 
incentive for match-fixing and the reward for participating in it (Skokas 2012). 
 
Discussion 
Earlier in this article, it was suggested that ‘mafias’ or ‘mafia-type organisations’ are 
presented as being actively involved in football match-fixing. We are not, of course, 
in the position to comment as to whether these or similar entities are involved in 
match-fixing in other contexts or internationally. What our data has shown however, 
is that in Greece the presence of ‘mafias’ or ‘mafia-type’ organisations in matchfixing 
is far from the truth. Unsurprisingly, a view of these match-fixing activities as 
the result of robust, continuous and hierarchical predatory organisational structures is 
not accurate. What emerges from this study is that the entities involved in the 
business of match-fixing are networks i.e., fluid and dynamic social systems that 
consist of patterns of relationships among people/actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994; 
von Lampe 2003). Football match-fixing does not require a great degree of sophistication, 
and management of resources or labour. Towards this end, match-fixing 
networks tend to have a naturally defined horizontal ‘structure’. Participants on these 
networks many times act on improvisation such as in the case of the outcome of a 
match-fixing process not being pragmatised by the first half of the match. A number 
of individuals act as intermediaries who bring together disconnected parts (see 
Morselli and Roy 2008) by controlling in a sense all the information asymmetries 
that make up the networks (see Burt 1992). What merely exist are individuals or 
small groups forming temporary collaborations in order for their shared objective, 
making profit (or ensuring that a club wins which also has financial long-term 
implications), to materialise. 
Overall, the image of the business that emerges from our examination of a series of 
its aspects from the 2011 scandal does not vindicate the heavy emphasis that orthodox 
accounts of ‘organised crime’ place on characteristics such as rigid organisation, 
coordination, hierarchy and so on. Rather, our findings are consistent with views of 
match-fixing as a criminal activity being less robust from an organisational viewpoint, 
carried out by individuals or clusters of individuals that assemble on the basis of 
opportunity rather than authority. In contrast to other contexts, such as Belgium, the 
primary actors are not foreigners (see Hill 2010, 2013) but native individuals who are 
embedded in the Greek football industry. 
We nevertheless believe that it is possible to return to certain more fundamental 
questions about the context of match-fixing in Greece and specifically to ask how it is 
located within the overall political and economic context in the country. By putting 
emphasis on ‘organised criminal activities’ in football match-fixing the question of the 
important role of the upperworld for the whole business is ignored. There are a number 
of indigenous conditions that operate as a fertile ground for match-fixing especially in 
the last 20–30 years or so although it is since the beginning of the 2000s that the 
problem of match-fixing has grown. Specifically, what has been the case in Greece is 
that football, since the beginning of the 1980s when the sport became ‘professionalised’ 
and football clubs in the first, second and third division were transformed into 
companies, has been used as a platform of action for extremely powerful individuals 
who use football clubs and the popular support for them not only as an income source 
per ser (season tickets, advertisements, merchandise, etc.) which is particularly the case 
for big clubs but also as a vehicle for tax evasion and money laundering, as a protection 
shield against the state, and as leverage towards securing state bids (Dabilis 2011). 
From the moment football clubs are companies that are to be protected as investments, 
sport itself becomes a secondary concern. 
There was not enough evidence as to who was the ‘head’ of the ‘paraga’ or who was 
the highest bidder or best client of a match-fixing network. However, the ‘paraga’ 
facilitated match-fixing in primarily two ways: firstly, it changed the structure of 
modern Greek football radically, by minimising outcome uncertainty and, therefore, 
amplifying competitive imbalance within the top league at any cost (see Eleftherotypia 
2013a; see also Cheloukhine 2013). The financial implications this entails included the 
above mentioned creation of ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ clubs and the continuously widened gap 
between them. 
Secondly, the ‘paraga’ was instrumental in corruption becoming widespread in 
Greek football in the presence of self-governance and autonomy of the Greek football 
in which state monitoring is virtually absent. It created an environment of distrust in 
which most clubs had to ‘pick sides’ if they wanted to guarantee preferential treatment, 
better positioning in play-offs, avoidance of relegation, increased chances of promotion 
or playing in European competitions etc. This pervasive corruption in the world of 
Greek football has been demonstrated to basically act as providing a comparative 
advantage to those structures which do not operate according to officially established 
rules something that is prevalent in other manifestations of ‘organised crime’ in the 
country (see Antonopoulos and Tagarov 2012). Inevitably, match-fixing in this 
endemically corrupt environment, has become a viable, rather short-term solution 
for many football clubs as well as a way of making sure that money is being 
made under the enormous financial pressure that most Greek football clubs (even 
the traditionally powerful ones) face in the current entrepreneurial and financial 
landscape of the country. One of the reasons for the financial hardship of football 
clubs, among other, is the reduced attendance in the Greek stadia with an average 
of 4.328 spectators per Super League football match according to Super League data 
(Koumbis 2013). 
An important indigenous condition favouring football match-fixing in Greece is 
politics. Perhaps unlike other contexts, what happens in Greece is that the clubs 
participating in match-fixing for financial or not reasons are in essence protected 
against any significant punishment by the politicians of the locality the clubs are based 
in. These politicians either act as intermediaries between the club and the criminal 
justice or sports authorities by intervening to protect the club and satisfy their electoral 
clientele or –in extreme and rather unusual cases - actually participate in the matchfixing 
itself (see SKAI 2013). In 1999, for example, the mayor of Skydra, a town in 
northern Greece, donated 16 million drachmas (approximately €47,000) to the club of 
the town, Aetos Skydras, 5 million of which (approximately €14,600) were to be spent 
towards bribing actors of a game so that the club is promoted (Eleftherotypia 2013c). 
Politicians in Greece owe their very existence to the gray relationships with individuals 
or groups that help these politicians assume a certain degree of power (the so called 
‘client relationships’ or ‘rousfeti’). As it is suggested in Antonopoulos and Tagarov’s 
(2012) study, the nature of social relationships in Greece is such as to favour gray 
transactions; especially in areas of the country in which politicians already have 
extremely good personal relationships with citizens, that means that they are elected 
by them on the basis of favours, which many times involves turning a blind eye to 
criminal activities or providing a protective shield to these activities. 
Finally, the issue of football match-fixing - and in light of the widespread corruption 
in the football industry – as mentioned earlier, has to be seen within the wider context 
of betting practices of the Greek public as well as the whole betting market in Greece 
which seems to be a relatively healthy one despite the current adverse economic 
conditions in the country. According to GamblingData (2011), the official Greek 
betting market is worth in turnover terms more than €2.1 billion per year and is 
high by international standards. In addition, spend per person on sports betting are 
significantly higher in Greece than other important contexts (e.g., Italy), despite the 
Greek public only having access to a partial and non-competitive/monopolic sportsbetting 
market (controlled by one state licensed entity, OPAP). If one also considers 
the online, overseas betting outlets for which, unfortunately, no figures are available, 
it is obvious that the market is huge. Actors in the football match-fixing business do 
nothing more than diverting money from the market to their own pockets by 
manipulating results and other aspects of the game that is in their power. In this 
sense, football match-fixing in Greece appears to be an integral part of a symbiosis 
between personal greed, aspirations and needs, as well as ferocious market dynamics 
in the world of football that disadvantage most of the football clubs, their players 
and their officials who now operate as small and medium entrepreneurs cutting 
corners in the absence of substantial regulation. 
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